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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 04-2143
                    
CYNTHIA A. EBBERT,
Appellant
v.
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
a Delaware Corporation
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-00029)
Honorable Gregory M. Sleet, District Judge
                    
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 8, 2005
BEFORE: BARRY, AMBRO, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed April 14, 2005)
                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before the court on Cynthia A. Ebbert’s appeal from an order
for summary judgment entered on March 25, 2004, in this action that she brought under
2the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against DaimlerChrysler
Corporation.  The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The district court set forth the background
of the case in its memorandum opinion of March 25, 2004, and there is some reference to
the history and facts of the case in the district court’s prior opinion, Ebbert v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 192 F. Supp.2d 303 (D. Del. 2002), dealing with the timeliness of
this action, and in our opinion in Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103 (3d Cir.
2003), reversing the district court’s order granting DaimlerChrysler summary judgment. 
The proceedings we now review ensued following the remand we directed in our
disposition of the earlier appeal.
Ebbert on this appeal raises two points:
I.  The defendant did not engage in an ‘interactive process’ when it never
met with the plaintiff, never talked to the plaintiff about her capabilities,
and never made an individualized analysis of her abilities, but rather
characterized her abilities by defendant’s own stereotyping and prejudice.
II.  The lower court erroneously refused to permit the plaintiff a full
opportunity for discovery, with respect to discovery requests filed before
discovery deadlines in order to determine if there were job vacancies within
the plaintiff’s capabilities.
Appellant’s br. at i.
The parties are in agreement that we exercise plenary review in considering the
first issue, which the court resolved in granting summary judgment, see Kopec v. Tate,
361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 453 (2004), and thus we can affirm
3with respect to that issue only if we conclude “that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party [DaimlerChrysler] is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  They also agree that we review the second issue on
an abuse of discretion basis.  See Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2000).
After our review of this matter it appears that sufficient evidence shows that
Ebbert, whose determination to return to work we admire, could not perform the essential
functions of her former position or any other position that might be available for her with
or without reasonable accommodations and thus she cannot prevail in this matter.  See
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999); Gaul v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998).  Moreover, though the district court
indicated that there “can be little dispute that Ebbert has set forth sufficient facts to
sustain” her claim that her employer took an adverse action as a result of her disability,
we question whether this is so.  District court op. at 9 n.5.  In fact, the record shows that
DaimlerChrysler sought to accommodate Ebbert and that any adverse action it took was
because it could not employ her as she was unable to perform the functions of any
position available to her.  Indeed, we agree with the district court that “the undisputed
record evidence establishes that DaimlerChrysler acted with equanimity under the
circumstances.”  Id. at 14 n.8.  
We also point out that there is some question as to whether Ebbert’s application to
the Social Security Administration for disability benefits should bar this action because
    We do not reach this point because it is not necessary to do so and not because we1
cannot do so.  Thus, we reject Ebbert’s contention that the circumstance that the district
court did not pass on the point precludes us from reaching it.  See appellant’s reply br. at
18 n.3.  If a party raises an issue in the district court it can raise the issue on appeal even
if the district court did not rule on the point.
4
she represented in her application that she was disabled.  See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt.
Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603 (1999); Motley v. New Jersey
State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1999).  The district court in its opinion
indicated that DaimlerChrysler raised this inconsistency point but the court avoided
determining the consequence of the inconsistency because it placed its decision on other
bases.  Though we take the same approach as the district court on the social security
application issue we do doubt that Ebbert has tendered a satisfactory explanation of the
inconsistency between her claims under the ADA and the Social Security Act.1
Finally we consider Ebbert’s contention that the district court abused its discretion
in limiting discovery.  After our review of this matter, we find no merit to this contention
and will not discuss it further.
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order for summary judgment entered
March 25, 2004.
                    
